Abstract
Introduction
The problem of uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing those involved in the construction of institutions of international governance. Our knowledge of the social and natural systems that we seek to govern is less dependable than is commonly acknowledged, and our ability to predict the consequences of our interventions into them is more limited than we like to believe. In this article, we offer a model of ' adaptive governance ' as one way to respond to the pervasive uncertainty that we believe confronts many decision-makers in international institutions. At its heart, adaptive governance accepts and responds to uncertainty by promoting learning in and through the policy-making process. It does so in a number of ways: by avoiding irreversible interventions and impacts, by encouraging constant monitoring of outcomes; by facilitating the participation of multiple voices in transparent policy-making processes; and by refl exively highlighting the limitations of the knowledge on which policy choices are based.
We illustrate our concept of adaptive governance by applying it to the World Trade Organization, and in particular to the treatment by the WTO of national trade measures addressing the problem of invasive alien species. This problem is a serious one, and involves grappling with particularly challenging uncertainties. Our focus on invasive species, however, should not obscure the more general applicability of our ideas on adaptive governance to other areas and other institutions -the point, rather, is to paint a more concrete picture of adaptive governance than is possible through abstract generalities, and to offer some preliminary suggestions on the particular institutional forms that adaptive governance may take in specifi c contexts.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we provide some background on the environmental problems posed by invasive alien species. Following other commentators, we note the role that international trade plays as an important vector for the spread of invasive alien species, and introduce the WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which disciplines governmental attempts to address these problems by restricting trade. Section 3 introduces ecological thinking on the nature, sources, and extent of uncertainty in environmental management, focussing in particular on the presence of persistent and largely irreducible uncertainty. In Section 4, the heart of this article, we set out the core characteristics of ' adaptive governance ' as one response to pervasive and irreducible uncertainty. Our ideas in this section are drawn from a number of literatures, but most directly borrow from new approaches to environmental governance developed since the 1970s under the rubric of ' adaptive management ' . This then leads to Part 5, in which we make a preliminary evaluation of the WTO as an institution of adaptive governance, and suggest some avenues for further developing the WTO along these lines. alien species are termed ' invasive ' if and to the extent that such proliferation occurs, and causes adverse impacts. 1 Invasive alien species (IAS) have a wide range of direct and indirect adverse effects on national economies, human health, food security, local livelihoods, ecosystems, and biodiversity. They have been known to: disrupt agriculture, forestry, transportation, and tourism; cause or spread disease in humans, crops, livestock, and wildlife; impact adversely water supplies, food stores, and production; and cause extinction, disruption, or decline of native species and ecosystems. 2 In the United States, for example, the economic cost of a sub-sample of invasive species was estimated in 2000 at US$137 billion per year.
3 This is not just a problem in the developed world: water hyacinth alone is estimated to cost developing countries over US$100 million annually, and can jeopardize both local development and the success of donor interventions. 4 Furthermore, IAS are now recognized as posing the second most serious threat to global biodiversity, second only to habitat loss and destruction. 5 As the delay between entry of an alien species and its proliferation and detection may be many decades, 6 current impacts may actually represent only a small fraction of the ultimate harm caused.
Importantly, the impacts of IAS are typically both unpredictable and irrevocable. Once established, IAS may proliferate rapidly, making efforts to eradicate them untenable, and efforts to mitigate them or their impacts extremely diffi cult and costly. Only a tiny fraction of invasives are successfully eradicated.
7 Their effects are highly idiosyncratic and require novel and intensive intervention strategies. This means that prevention is typically the only strategy for effective avoidance of impacts and virtually always the cost-effective option. Species and Biodiversity Management (1999) , at 103 -125. 7 Simberloff, ' The Politics of Assessing Risk for Biological Invasions: The USA as a Case Study ' , 20(6) Trends in Ecology and Evolution (2005) 216. For example, the ' mile-a-minute ' vine ( Mikania micrantha), introduced deliberately into Asia, can grow 27mm a day. A single plant can cover more than 25 sq. m. in a few months, and produce up to 40,000 seeds a year (discussed in International trade is a major vector for movement of invasive species.
9 Some species are introduced intentionally, as agricultural commodities, pets, or garden plants, or for forestry, fi sheries, or pasture improvement. Other introductions are unintentional, as organisms or their eggs, larvae, or seeds move along trade ' pathways ' : on cargo, in containers, in ships, in packaging material, in wood, plants, and seeds, or in the ballast water that ships take on in one port and disgorge in another. Increased fl ows of international trade therefore increase the chance of the introduction of IAS, which in turn raises the likelihood of successful establishment. Similarly, the greater the variety and means of available transport, the greater the array of species that may be moved and the more numerous their pathways for transfer. Faster transport also improves the chances of survival in transit. 10 The relationship between the movement of IAS and the intensifi cation of global trade fl ows places confl icting pressures on national and international regulatory authorities. On one hand, there is a clear need for comprehensive programmes for the prevention, assessment, management, and eradication of IAS. Inevitably, such programmes will involve monitoring, and in many circumstances restricting, the fl ow of international trade. On the other hand, there is an equally clear interest in ensuring that any impediments to trade which arise as a consequence are not unjustifi ed or unnecessary. A mechanism is needed, therefore, to balance these potentially competing interests, to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate trade-restrictive measures, and to ensure that regulatory processes embody an appropriate accommodation of these two imperatives.
The WTO's SPS Agreement offers one such mechanism, based (in part) on an appeal to scientifi c expertise as an arbiter of regulatory rationality. As is well known, Article 2.2 of the WTO's SPS Agreement requires Members to ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are ' based on scientifi c principles ' and are ' not maintained without scientifi c evidence ' . Article 5.1 sets out an obligation to ensure that SPS measures are ' based on a risk assessment . . . of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health ' . Where there is insuffi cient evidence to conduct a risk assessment, Article 5.7 establishes a right 11 provisionally to adopt protective measures ' on the basis of available pertinent information ' . The SPS Agreement also establishes the SPS Committee, which is broadly tasked with monitoring and facilitating the operation of the agreement, and providing a forum for consultations on matters relating to it.
These ' science provisions ' of the SPS Agreement have been the subject of considerable criticism.
12 Some of this criticism has come from what might be termed a development perspective: on the one hand, concern that exporters from developing countries may not have the resources to meet stringent safety standards imposed by developed country regulators; on the other, concern that developing country regulators face severe scientifi c and technical capacity limitations. But more relevant in the present context are criticisms of the very notion that environmental restrictions ought to be subject to international scrutiny in relation to their scientifi c justifi cation. Some have suggested that the framework structurally subordinates the goal of environmental protection to that of trade liberalization: the requirement for positive scientifi c evidence of potential harm, it is argued, refl ects an implicit presumption that traded goods or trade pathways are environmentally safe until evidence indicates otherwise. Where risks are complex and poorly understood, it is said, or where resources to gather such evidence are lacking, this presumption may lead to significant unintended damage. Others have suggested that these provisions rest on naïve assumptions about the objectivity, reliability, and certainty of scientifi c knowledge.
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Regulatory models relying too heavily on traditional risk assessment techniques, it is noted, risk becoming dysfunctional where these assumptions do not hold -that is, where scientifi c processes fail objectively to identify the nature and existence of risks to be addressed with adequate certainty and reliability. Furthermore, it is argued that these provisions may lead WTO dispute settlement bodies to ' second-guess ' scientifi c authorities, or to attempt to arbitrate between plausible competing scientifi c viewpoints. Regulators may thereby be discouraged from putting appropriate safeguards in place where there is a perceived inadequacy or insuffi ciency of presently-existing scientifi c knowledge about potential risks.
Although few of these criticisms have been made specifi cally in the context of the problem of IAS, they are highly relevant to it. As outlined earlier, the risks posed 12 For a selection of the commentary see Wirth, ' The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines ' , 27 Cornell In'l LJ (1994) by IAS are indeed complex and poorly understood, and traditional processes of risk assessment are therefore arguably less effective in this area. The core issue at the heart of this article is thus squarely raised: what are the implications of ' scientifi c uncertainty ' for the WTO -not only for the application and interpretation of the SPS Agreement, but more generally for the way it goes about overseeing and reviewing the trade-restrictive environmental regulation of its Members? The next section begins to address that question by exploring ecological thinking on the nature and sources of the uncertainty facing decision-makers in this area.
Understanding Uncertainty: Lessons from Ecology
A relatively recent article by Walker serves as a useful starting point for discussing the origin and extent of scientific uncertainty in risk assessment.
14 Walker carefully breaks down the process of risk assessment, and identifies numerous different sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about which models and categories to use to generate hypotheses; uncertainty derived from the unreliability and invalidity of measurement techniques; uncertainty as to the representativeness of the sample used to generate data; and uncertainty about the extent to which statistical associations imply causa tion. He also makes the important point that our knowledge of the risks posed by our actions is always and necessarily limited. Risks can never be assessed in a wholly objective manner, but rather must always be in some degree a product of contestable choices and decisions on the part of those producing assessments of risk. Walker uses the notion of scientific uncertainty, then, to highlight the extent to which processes of scientific risk assessment can never provide a ' neutral arbiter ' of actual risk, but rather are inevitably ' value-laden ' .
Ideas from ecological science on the nature and sources of scientifi c uncertainty overlap with, and complement, these ideas in important ways. Instead of focussing on uncertainties which result from limitations in our ways of knowing the world, ecological perspectives tend to emphasize the extent to which uncertainty is a function of the complex properties of the phenomenon under study.
In recent decades, our scientifi c understanding of the dynamics and behaviour of ecosystems has been transformed. 15 Classical ecological models assume that nature is governed by mechanistic natural laws, discoverable though scientifi c inquiry. Ecosystem 14 Walker, ' The Myth of Science as a " Neutral Arbiter " for Triggering Precautions ' , 26 Boston College Int'l and Comp L Rev (2003) dynamics and characteristics are presupposed in such models to be predictable, and to involve movement toward a stable, identifi able, equilibrium state, which can provide a clear reference point for management and decision-making. The inadequacy of such models, however, has been progressively highlighted since the 1970s. The ' new ecology '
16 emphasizes the prevalence of disturbance and disequilibrium dynamics within ecosystems in a constant state of fl ux. It is grounded in the recognition that ecosystems must be understood as systems , which involve an interacting multiplicity of biotic and abiotic components -plants, animals, microbes, climate, hydrology, pollination, symbiosis, predation, competition, and so on. They cannot be reduced to their component parts, but show emergent properties: phenomena arising at higher organisational levels which cannot be straightforwardly predicted from knowledge of interactions at lower levels. Complex systems are dynamic rather than static -rather than maintaining stable equilibrium states, they continually change, evolve, and adapt. Furthermore, they are not susceptible to precise prediction. While individual interactions or sub-sets can be mapped and modelled, the entirety cannot. Generalizations across systems are also problematic, as the structure, composition, and dynamics of an ecosystem may be contingent on its specifi c history and spatial context. Non-linear dynamics, discontinuous behaviour, and threshold effects are to be expected. Small disturbances in one variable or interaction, for instance, can cause dramatic changes, and these may ' cascade ' through other levels of the system with unpredictable impacts. Ecosystems may have a variety of locally stable states, may ' fl ip ' from one to another due to poorly understood interactions, and such state changes may be irreversible.
The result is that environmental risks can be very diffi cult to predict. They often cannot be specifi ed by a few precisely determined variables, but may instead be driven by the interaction of changes taking place at very different temporal and/or spatial scales. For instance, local pest outbreaks may be driven by long-term land-use intensifi cation and ecosystem simplifi cation coupled with short-term weather conditions. Furthermore, many environmental threats may increasingly refl ect slow changes, the decades-or centuries-long accumulation of human infl uences on the environment, which can nonetheless cause abrupt changes. Slow long-term change in fresh water nutrient levels, for example, can lead to sudden toxic algal blooms. The drivers of threats couple local to global -national problems such as changing climate or freshwater degradation may be driven by factors both local and across the world. Finally, ecological threats are mediated by both natural processes and human cultural, economic and trade dynamics, so understanding the behaviour of a system requires the inclusion of human activities and processes.
This array of characteristics means that our knowledge of complex systems is characterized by uncertainty of a particularly fundamental and persistent kind. A good deal of the present discussion of scientifi c uncertainty and the WTO emphasizes what may be called ' epistemic ' uncertainty: uncertainty resulting from inadequate knowledge, or from inherent cognitive limitations in our ways of knowing the world. This kind of uncertainty includes, for instance, limited and inaccurate data, incomplete knowledge, measurement error, imperfect models, and subjective judgement. While these forms of uncertainty may characterize our understanding of ecosystems, more challenging still is what can be characterized as ' variability ' or ' ontological ' uncertainty. 17 This form of uncertainty derives from the variability, randomness, or unpredictability of the system under investigation. Crucially, it is inherent and persistent, and is not susceptible to being reduced or resolved by more research. More information, analysis, and science may increase our understanding, but has no necessary impact on predictive power. ' In co-evolving systems of humans and nature ' , as one author notes, ' surprises are the rule, not the exception ' .
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Recognition of the prevalence of irreducible uncertainty and ignorance in confronting environmental problems and threats has prompted many to question both classical scientifi c methods and traditional frameworks for environmental management. In the domain of scientifi c practice, the limitations of classical scientifi c techniques of precise prediction, modelling, and risk analysis for environmental problems have been highlighted, and substantial effort has focussed on the development of scientifi c techniques that recognize and respond to inherent uncertainties of dynamic, complex systems. These have been developed under the rubrics of (among others) ' post-normal ' science 19 , ' sustainability science ' , 20 and ' science for sustainable development ' 21 . In the domain of environmental management, there has been a sustained effort to construct new approaches, which are based on expectations of surprise and unpredictability, which take into account the potential for abrupt, unpredictable, and irreversible change, and which are sensitive to interactional and system-wide effects. The following section addresses some aspects of this literature, setting out some recent thinking on the implications of pervasive uncertainty for environmental management. 
Responding to Uncertainty: Lessons from Adaptive Management
When ignorance, surprise, and uncertainty are viewed as unavoidable aspects of scientifi c inquiry -when, indeed, their prevalence is confi rmed by scientifi c inquiry -new models of policy-making may be required, guided by different principles, and based on a different understanding of the relation between science and policy-making. One sustained attempt to develop a new approach has arisen in the literature on ' adaptive environmental management ' . This approach had its genesis in the 1970s in the fi elds of ecology and environmental management, 22 and in the decades since has grown into a substantial body of work.
23 Adaptive management describes an approach to managing ecological resources which recognizes and responds directly to the uncertainty and complexity characteristics of large-scale ecosystems. It sets out principles and approaches to decision-making and management in circumstances where it is not possible reliably to predict ecosystem behaviour, including risks of adverse states or outcomes. The concept and practice of adaptive management have now been developed and elaborated by a range of different writers and practitioners across a range of contexts, from fi sheries, community forestry, and waterfowl protection to riparian regimes and grazing land restoration. It has provided an infl uential conceptual framework for approaching environmental management, and has been widely endorsed at both the international and national levels as refl ecting best practice across a broad range of environmental areas. 24 Its development has led to calls for ' adaptive governance ' -policy and governance structures that support and enable these adaptive responses to uncertainty (see Section 5).
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Before setting out some key characteristics of adaptive management, it is worth pausing to draw attention to the relationship between this scholarship and some cognate literatures in the social sciences. Over the last three or so decades, a number of 22 Holling, supra note 15; C.S. Holling (ed.), Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (1978 broad fi elds of study have grown and developed within the social sciences, which are united (with each other, as well as with work on adaptive management) by a common focus on three related themes: the complexity and uncertainty associated with various aspects of social life; the need for some intensifi ed form of ' social learning ' (broadly defi ned) as a response to this uncertainty; and the role of institutions and governance systems in facilitating such learning processes. Three fi elds of study are worth mentioning in particular. First, the increasing complexity and volatility of modern markets has led many to focus on the role of innovation and adaptability in economic life. This has given rise to research into processes of learning within organizations (fi rms), 26 as well as the problem of creating refl exive institutional frameworks to facilitate such constant learning and innovation.
27 While focussed primarily on national and regional levels of economic governance, this literature has recently begun to focus greater attention on institutions at the international level.
28 Secondly, primarily within international relations scholarship, there is a body of work on the behaviour of states in circumstances of complex interdependence. Some writers in this area concentrate on the need to develop fl exible and adaptive international institutions, to respond to rapidly changing global conditions, as well as to changes in our knowledge of the causes of global problems. Others focus on the role that international institutions currently play in facilitating action in the face of potentially paralysing uncertainty, including by helping states to develop cognitive models through which to make sense of a complex world, and to identify their interests in it. 29 Thirdly, there is an important body of work in the area of public law and administration, describing and theorizing the recent development of learning-centred alternatives to traditional command-and-control regulatory frameworks, variously described as ' experimentalist ' governance, ' refl exive governance ' , or ' new governance approaches ' . 30 In all of these three literatures, one fi nds ideas which overlap considerably with those put forward, in a very different context, under the rubric of adaptive management.
Our description of adaptive management in this section is fi rmly anchored in the environmental literature. However, it is informed in a variety of different ways by work from these disparate branches of the social sciences. For one thing, our reading of these literatures has helped to persuade us that these ideas have useful application outside the area of ecological management. More specifi cally, we focus on features of adaptive management which are also found in the three literatures just described, and are therefore already somewhat familiar in the study of economic behaviour and international institutions. We also augment the concepts of adaptive management with concepts drawn from these literatures. Furthermore, our efforts to apply the framework of adaptive management to the WTO (in Section 5) are heavily infl uenced by the ways in which these literatures have already started to apply similar concepts to other international institutions and other aspects of social life. Finally, and most broadly, we take from this literature a deep analogy between complex biological systems and complex social systems (such as the international trading system): both can usefully be understood as exhibiting similar uncertainty characteristics, and therefore both may benefi t from a similar learning-centred governance framework.
In the remainder of this section, we set out fi ve related characteristics of what may be called ' adaptive governance ' , which we believe are of particular relevance in the context of analysis of the WTO and the SPS Agreement, and illustrate them within the context of regulation of IAS.
A Learning
Perhaps the defi ning characteristic of adaptive governance is its focus on facilitating continuous learning as a necessary part of any response to pervasive uncertainty and systemic unpredictability. This refl ects the premise that a single ' snapshot ' of the world, scientifi c or otherwise, is inadequate to refl ect a dynamic and evolving reality and to respond to continually changing information and understanding. All minimally functional policy-making processes, of course, involve some mechanism for encouraging policy learning. In adaptive governance structures, however, learning plays a uniquely central role. It occurs regularly and self-consciously rather than solely on an ad hoc or isolated basis. It becomes part of an institution's or policy's central tasks or objectives rather than a supplementary function. The four further characteristics listed below all follow, to some degree, from this focus on learning.
Two different forms of learning are usefully distinguished. ' Simple learning ' refers to the acquisition of information, the development of new skills, and the building of new competencies.
31 It refers to a process by which actors involved in the regulatory process receive new and updated information, learn how to resolve defi ned problems more effectively over time, and adapt their problem-solving skills to changing conditions. In the policy-making context, this typically involves change to the ' levels ' or ' settings ' of policy instruments, or the techniques used to achieve fi xed policy goals.
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' Complex learning ' is of a different sort. If simple learning is a response to inadequate information, complex learning is a response to the fundamental limitations of human cognition. Rather than learning better solutions to defi ned problems, complex learning involves redefi ning the problem to be addressed, and revisiting the question of what constitutes relevant ' knowledge ' about a particular problem. 33 It also involves 31 The distinction between simple and complex learning is a very common one -see, e.g., Levy, supra note 29 -but we take this formulation from developing critical awareness of the inherently limited nature of our knowledge, and therefore acknowledging the extent of our intrinsic ignorance and capacity for mistake. In the parlance of certain international relations scholars, this form of learning can involve the reconstitution of actors' preferences, identities, and principled beliefs. 34 It involves also the destabilization and reconstruction of the ' cognitive map ' which policy-makers use to make sense of the world and defi ne their role within it. Crucially, our vision of adaptive governance includes the facilitation of both forms of learning, and therefore goes beyond the emphasis on mere technical improvement associated with simple learning.
The regulation of IAS is an excellent example of the need to facilitate and promote learning in governance structures. First, as pointed out above, scientifi c capacity to predict the nature and likelihood of potential impacts of alien species is extremely limited, so there is a clear justifi cation for continually revisiting and reassessing decisions in the light of new information, insights, and experiences on a global scale. Secondly, in the case of IAS the system or subject under examination -the alien species in a novel environment -is itself a dynamic, evolving entity.
35 Species are not static entities, but adapt and evolve within new environments, and their host environments likewise change. Climate change, for example, will shift the ranges in which species are able to establish and proliferate. Even in the short term, factors such as further introductions can dramatically alter IAS impacts. Accumulating this sort of rapidly changing and increasing information encourages simple learning, but can also facilitate a degree of complex learning -about, for instance, the nature and scope of ignor ance and uncertainty, the dynamic nature of risk, and the limits of science-based predictive strategies.
B Policy-making as Experimentation
Policy interventions have typically been understood as distinct from, and subsequent to, processes of knowledge accumulation and risk analysis. Adaptive governance approaches, on the other hand, understand policy-making as an integral part of an ongoing learning process. They emphasize processes of ' learning by doing ' , and treat policy interventions as quasi-experiments. Since surprise and unpredictability are expected, unforeseen consequences are treated as valuable opportunities for learning.
There are at least three corollaries of this experimentalist approach to policy-making. First, it will often be necessary to take action despite a high level of uncertainty. Because they are designed precisely to enable action in conditions of radically incomplete knowledge, adaptive governance approaches do not ' postpone action until " enough " is known but acknowledg[e] that time and resources are too short to defer some action, particularly actions to address urgent problems ' . the context of adaptive governance are specifi cally designed to produce critical information, which may help to reduce uncertainty and broaden the base of knowledge and experience. In the environmental management context, so-called ' active ' adaptive management may involve deliberate experimental perturbations of the system in order to produce information. 37 Of course, active interventions of this kind should be viewed in light of the need for reversibility: there is always a serious risk that such strategies may over time become little more than excuses for risk-taking. 38 They will therefore only be appropriate where the system in question has some resilience, that is, where the changes induced by adaptive management interventions do not risk unacceptable and/or irreversible outcomes, and where adequate supervisory and accountability mechanisms are in place. 39 This third corollary (avoiding irreversibility) is addressed in more detail below.
In the context of IAS, taking action in the face of uncertainty will typically mean taking action to prevent the introduction of IAS even where there is less than conclusive evidence of potential harm. There is abundant evidence of the serious impacts that IAS can cause, most of them unintended or unforeseen. At the same time, preventive measures to combat IAS will often be coupled with more positive policy interventions designed to produce knowledge about the system under investigation. Clearly any uncontrolled introduction of species raises unacceptable risks of serious irreversible damage, even if it would provide useful information. Where there is a strong case for introduction of an alien species, however, there may be a range of other policy options, involving tightly controlled, quantitatively limited, and geographically circumscribed introduction, which may produce information useful for management.
C Avoiding Irreversible Harm
Recognition of the uncertain, dynamic, and evolving character of environmental, social, and economic systems leads to a strong emphasis on maintaining the resilience of a system. 40 Given that it is not possible precisely to predict what a complex system will do, or precisely to engineer the maintenance of a static desired state, one important goal of policy and management becomes the maintenance of a system's resilience, and its ability to adapt and evolve. The fi rst requirement of this is to seek to avoid irreversible negative environmental states. These severely curtail future policy options and preclude opportunities for experimentation and learning. Adaptive governance approaches therefore prefer highly provisional and reversible policy interventions, in respect of both form and consequences, as well as the development of strict 37 Walters, ' Challenges in Adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems ' , 1(2) Conservation Ecology (1997) 1. 38 We are indebted to Jacqueline Peel for drawing our attention more closely to this danger.
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' Adaptive management cannot be applied when the risks of failure are socially and legally unacceptable ' : Gunderson, supra note 18. 40 Holling, supra note 15 ; Gunderson, supra note 18 ; Folke et al. , supra note 23. oversight mechanisms to encourage or ensure this reversibility. Policy interventions should seek the quality of robustness to uncertainties -even if assumptions or judgements are wrong, irreversible damage has been avoided and the opportunity for better decisions is left open.
With respect to IAS, avoiding irreversible damage mandates a strong emphasis on prevention of entry of potentially invasive species. As discussed earlier, only a tiny proportion of successfully established invasions are reversed, and even should future techniques have more success invasions may cause irreversible impacts, such as destruction of ecological communities, species extinction, and soil erosion. Policy which does not place a high premium on preventing entry of invasive species, in the face of uncertain and unreliably predictive risks, forecloses future policy options, learns too late to avoid damage, and will struggle continuously with negative and irrevocable ' surprise ' .
D Monitoring and Feedback
Policy-making in the context of adaptive governance is an iterative process of review and revision. Scientifi c knowledge is not seen as defi nitive or fi nal, but provisional and subject to review in the light of new information and new priorities. The smooth functioning of this iterative process depends crucially on the development of mechanisms for monitoring the substantive outcomes of policy on an ongoing basis. Such monitoring mechanisms should take account of the specifi city of outcomes both across space and time: the impact of an action or intervention will not necessarily be the same in different systems or at different points in time. In addition, the outcomes of the monitoring process should routinely be fed back into the policy-making or management process, to reassess goals, assumptions in models, and policy objectives themselves. Such self-conscious monitoring and feedback mechanisms can help facilitate learning, not only by fi ne-tuning the particular policy instruments chosen, but also by drawing attention to relevant knowledge gaps, revealing the shortcomings of the chosen problem-defi nition, highlighting the limitations of the forms of knowledge deployed in the policy-making process, and creating a culture of openness and experimentation in the conduct of policy. 41 There is a growing awareness of the inadequacy of current monitoring mechanisms in the prevention of IAS, and of the need for regulators to be responsive to the continually changing state of information on the impact of specifi c invasives, the state of invasion of particular areas, and the changing underlying environmental/ economic/social matrix which determines invasion risks. While local knowledge is essential, adaptive management approaches also emphasize the development of more effective mechanisms of global information sharing. Across the world information is rapidly accumulating about the impacts of IAS, much of which is being gathered and made available in a wide range of databases. However, even very recently, this information and these sources were not well-known or widely shared. 42 Further, the full 41 Sabel, supra note 27.
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McNeely et al. , supra note 1.
impacts of IAS on biodiversity and ecosystems have typically been incompletely and poorly recorded, compared with impacts on productive sectors such as agriculture and transport. While there have been calls for the establishment of an international framework for monitoring of invasives, this has yet to be developed. Efforts are underway, led by the Global Invasive Species Programme, a consortium of government and non-governmental partners, to establish constantly updated and globally shared and accessible databases and an Early Warning System for invasions. 43 Additional mechanisms would also be required to ensure that this information systematically feeds into the policy-making processes of all relevant organizations with an impact on IAS policy.
E Pluralism and Process
The fi nal characteristic is an important one. Although our vision of adaptive governance focuses on learning, we do not conceive of knowledge production as solely or even primarily a technical, expert-driven process. Rather, we understand the production of knowledge to be always and inevitably in part a social and political process. And we understand science-based decision-making necessarily to involve fundamental value choices. To the extent that uncertainty results from the necessary incompleteness of any single vision of knowledge, and of human cognition generally, adaptive governance approaches therefore necessitate a pluralist approach to knowledge. 44 In this context, the purpose of governance structures is not so much to identify a single, correct body of knowledge to guide policy, but in part to marshall alternative knowledges, map out uncertainties, and enable a disciplined process for decision-making in areas of uncertainty. 45 The aim of policy-making is not solely to accumulate more or better knowledge, as if that were in itself enough, but also to discover and highlight the inadequacies of prevailing knowledge frameworks. And policy-making is less about the attainment of a single optimal solution -as if ' best practice ' were simply a question of effi ciency -and more about providing a forum for the ongoing creation of consensual knowledge and agreed processes to guide policy. 46 One implication of this is that policy-making processes should be open and transparent. In particular, the underlying assumptions and judgements implicit in knowledge claims should be made transparent, explicit, and open to scrutiny. Furthermore, adaptive governance approaches emphasize the importance of open forums for discursive and communicative interaction -discussion, mutual sharing of information, problem-centred negotiation -in the formulation of policy. A second implication is 43 See www.gisp.org .
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Sabel and Reddy, supra note 28, at 2. the need for broader participation in the production and deployment of knowledge. Adaptive governance prioritizes recognition and accommodation of the diverse values and knowledges of different stakeholders. In part, this is because approaches integrating multiple perspectives tend to produce better outcomes. But it is also because, to the extent that it is recognized that no single optimal solution to policy problems exists, ' effi cient ' public policy becomes redefi ned as policy which responds as far as possible to the values, interests, and concerns of all stakeholders.
Learning to Learn at the WTO: Adaptive Governance and the International Trading System
So far, we have shown that much environmental policy-making occurs under conditions of pervasive and fundamental uncertainty, and we have argued that such pervasive uncertainty demands new institutions and new processes for making environmental policy. We called this ' adaptive governance ' . In this section, we argue further that this model of governance has important implications for the WTO. The justifi cation for this claim is twofold. First of all, we believe adaptive governance is potentially relevant not only to environmental policy itself, but also to policy disciplines such as trade, which must respond to environmental risks and have important environmental impacts. Secondly, to the extent that international economic systems are characterized by similar complexity and uncertainty as that which characterizes ecological systems, adaptive governance is equally important in the fi eld of international economic governance as it is in environmental management.
This section therefore maps out some initial thoughts on the form that adaptive governance might take in the WTO, in the particular context of efforts to address the problems posed by IAS. To what extent are the current rules and institutional forms of the WTO compatible with the demands of adaptive governance? In what ways might they be improved by more fully embodying adaptive governance principles? These questions in turn give rise to two distinct lines of enquiry. First, it is necessary to explore the extent to which the WTO can and does permit, facilitate, and promote learning (both simple and complex) in lower levels of governance such as national governments. Secondly, it is also necessary to examine how the WTO may incorporate adaptation and learning into its own mode of governance, and its own institutional and legal forms. These two lines of enquiry are examined in turn.
A The WTO as Facilitator of National Adaptive Governance 1 Enabling ' Precaution '
A great deal of the current literature concerns the need for governments to take ' precautionary ' approaches as a response to scientifi c uncertainty. To a large extent, the debate has come to be about the appropriateness of using the precautionary principle, the defi nition of the principle, and the extent to which disciplines under the SPS Agreement do in fact permit a precautionary approach.
47 Some have argued generally on the use of the precautionary principle as a guide to interpretation of the SPS Agreement as a whole. 48 Others have suggested the inclusion of the precautionary principle in some form in the text of the SPS Agreement or the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.
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Our emphasis on learning as a response to uncertainty cuts across this debate. On one hand, it is clear that in some circumstances, precautionary approaches are fully consistent with, and indeed an important element of, adaptive governance. Taking protective action despite incomplete and uncertain information, in the face of serious and/or irreversible harm, is not necessarily a departure from ' sound science ' , but rather is often fully consistent with -and indeed a direct response to -rigorous ecological science. Thus, one element of an adaptive governance agenda at the WTO is to ensure that its rules permit precautionary approaches where and to the extent appropriate.
To a large extent, it is now clear that the SPS Agreement provides considerable scope for the adoption of precautionary approaches by WTO Members. 50 Nevertheless, there are at least three specifi c points of concern that arise in the context of regulation of IAS.
First, the Appellate Body has made it clear that a risk assessment under Article 5.1 must identify and address a risk with a high degree of specifi city, including a specifi ed form of harm, a specifi ed mechanism by which that harm might be caused, and a specifi c degree of likelihood of harm. 51 As discussed earlier, however, our ability to understand and predict precise causal mechanisms in complex ecological systems is limited, and our power to predict specifi c outcomes even more constrained. Crucially, Forceful arguments to this effect include: Motaal, supra note 12 and Jenkins, supra note 12, though it should be acknowledged that these two commentators are more sanguine than most. See also the supportive argument of Burgiel et al. , supra note 8.
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EC -Hormones , supra note 47, para. 199ff (on the need for the evidence considered in a risk assessment to address the specifi c pathway at issue) and para. 186 (on the need for a risk assessment to address identifiable risks rather than generalized theoretical uncertainty); Japan -Apples , supra note 47, paras. 200 -206 (Japan's risk assessment was not directed to a specifi c agent and vector of contamination) and paras. 239 -242 (on the issue of theoretical uncertainty generally). the case for action against risks posed by any particular species or pathway for invasion is typically built not from consideration of that species or pathway alone, but from consideration of the vast range of unforeseen and unanticipated previous invaders and impacts. The risks posed by one organism may often be assessed according to previous experience with risks posed by the introduction of similar (but not identical) organisms into similar (but not identical) environments in the past. 52 Invasives policy that requires evidence that a specifi c species or pathway poses a threat ignores this long history of unintended introductions and unforeseen damage. As a result, the Appellate Body's approach on this point is a cause for concern. 53 Secondly, the Appellate Body has also expressed its doubt that protective SPS measures can be justifi ed by reference to what it calls ' theoretical uncertainty ' . 54 It is not entirely clear what the Appellate Body intends by this phrase, but it is possible to imagine a number of arguably legitimate justifi cations for protective measures against IAS which might be characterized as based on ' theoretical uncertainty ' . For example, a regulator might wish provisionally to ban the importation of a species, not because of positive evidence of the risks it poses, but because of a general concern that surprises are the norm in ecological management, and experience with this species is extremely limited. Indeed, in the context of IAS, even years of benign experience with a particular species does not imply that damaging impacts will not occur. Increasing numbers imported can increase chances of establishment and proliferation, or the ecological context can change, prompting unexpected changes in behaviour of a species in its host environment. 55 Alternatively, a regulator may wish to take protective measures even after a clean risk assessment, on the basis that the models on which the assessment was made may have identifi ed the wrong questions, or impeded our ability to imagine, and therefore test, relevant risks. These are not, as the Appellate Body has stressed, the kinds of risks and uncertainties which can be tested through further risk assessment -indeed, they arise precisely because of the fundamental inadequacy of the risk assessment process. There is a serious question, therefore, whether Article 5.1, which requires SPS measures to be based on a risk assessment, precludes regulators from acting on the basis of these deeper forms of uncertainty. (2003) 1059, 1088: ' the risk from harmful invasive species is fairly easy to describe at aggregate levels but very hard to describe for particular species. The risk assessment for many potential invasive species would be likely to suggest that the risk of introduction and spread for any individual species is low, but the risk of introduction and spread of some invasive species is high, and the harm from some of the invasive species that do spread is high ' . See also Sykes, supra note 12, 364.
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Walker, supra note 14; Perez, supra note 12, 136.
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EC -Hormones , supra note 47, para. 186; Japan -Apples , supra note 47, paras. 239 -242. 55 In Australia, for instance, years of experience with pampas grass in horticulture gave rise to no serious problems, as all plants were male. This changed suddenly when a hermaphroditic variety was introduced, causing sudden proliferation; T. Low, Feral Future: The Untold Story of Australia's Exotic Invaders (2002) . 56 It may be argued that Art. 5.7 may be used to rectify this problem. This seems unlikely, however, as the Panel in EC -Biotech, supra note 11, has apparently made clear that Art. 5.7 is no longer available as a safe harbour once a risk assessment of any sort has been completed: see, e.g., para. 7.3260.
Thirdly, on a more practical level, there is a reasonable concern that the disciplines of the SPS Agreement may impose too great a strain on the resource constraints of many developing countries. Where such a country wishes to take precautionary trade-restrictive measures, the costly procedures required by the SPS Agreement -not just the performance of specifi c risk assessments for an immense variety of species and pathways, but in some cases the creation of an entire administrative system of policymakers, independent scientifi c panels, and so on -may discourage them from doing so, or may even make it effectively impossible for them to do so.
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On the other hand, a ' learning ' response to uncertainty does not end with the adoption of precautionary approaches, nor does it elevate precaution to an over-riding principle on all occasions. A focus on learning reduces the excessive focus of contemporary debates on the precautionary principle, by embedding it within a much broader adaptive governance framework. In this framework, precaution is understood as a pragmatic guide for enabling action while avoiding catastrophic consequences. It is only one among a number of such guides, and its relative importance is to be assessed in each case and context. In the context of invasive alien species, for instance, the presence of both high levels of uncertainty and strong irreversibilities may argue in favour of a strong weighting. But it is necessarily accompanied by proactive measures to increase our knowledge base through policy experimentation. Furthermore, in learning approaches, policies primarily based on precaution are subject to ongoing review and revision as circumstances change and our state of knowledge advances. On this approach, therefore, the requirements under Article 5.7 that provisional measures be reviewed after a reasonable period of time and accompanied by efforts to obtain further information are appropriate, provided of course that practical resource constraints are sensitively taken into account. Precaution, then, in the context of adaptive governance is part of a larger package of principles designed to enable us to live in a world in which evidence is never conclusive. It is part of a framework which, far from counselling paralysis in the face of uncertainty, helps us to continue to live, act, make decisions, and innovate despite pervasive uncertainty about the consequences of our actions.
The ' Proceduralization ' of WTO Review
Another theme of the current literature concerns the need (or not) for deference by the WTO towards the judgments and decisions of national authorities. Where there is scope for multiple plausible scientifi c accounts, it is argued, and where science-based decisionmaking includes a large degree of value-based choices, variation is perfectly legitimate and to be expected. Following this argument, the implications for the WTO are obvious: its rules should permit legitimate variation in regulatory preferences across different jurisdictions; it should by and large defer to the judgement of local decision-makers; and it should not assume the role of arbiter between different, but equally open, scientifi c 57 It should be noted that the Appellate Body has made clear that a WTO Member imposing an SPS measure need not conduct risk assessment itself, but can rely on assessments carried out by others: EC -Hormones , supra note 47, para. 190. viewpoints. 58 Thus, some commentators argue that the WTO should confi ne itself to determining whether or not regulatory decisions are ' minimally adequate ' , or scientifi cally ' plausible ' , or have ' any reputable scientifi c support ' . 59 This core concern, that the WTO should not set itself up as an arbiter of objective science, has expressed itself in debate over a number of specifi c legal issues. Many relate to the proper use of scientifi c evidence in panel proceedings. Should scientifi c experts give evidence as a panel or as individuals?
60 What kinds of experts should be used, what kinds of questions are they qualifi ed to answer?
61 What weight ought to be given by panels to minority scientifi c viewpoints? Others relate to the way a Panel addresses itself to scientifi c evidence: does, for example, the panel's obligation to make an ' objective assessment of the matter before it ' require it to attempt an objective evaluation of alternative scientifi c views?
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Our learning approach mirrors these arguments for deference in some ways, but departs from them in others. On one hand, as noted earlier, policy-making in adaptive governance structures rests on a pluralist conception of science, and a conception of scientifi c understanding as necessarily partial and provisional. The notion that any international institution of governance acts as an arbiter of scientifi c truth is therefore anathema to it. To that extent, implementing adaptive governance in the WTO may involve attention to precisely those issues mentioned above. The implications of adaptive governance, however, extend well beyond limiting the intrusiveness of WTO review or ensuring that WTO Panels do not ' second-guess ' domestic decision-makers. Rather, the aim is to integrate the WTO as an active partner in the process of learning and adaptation. Deference-based approaches lead to an unduly limited programme of institutional change at the WTO. By conceptualizing WTO review solely as interference with domestic regulatory choices, and by focussing on the need to contain this interference in particular ways and in particular circumstances, such approaches tend to underestimate the extent to which the WTO may be able to act to enhance national governance structures. Furthermore, these approaches say little, if anything, about the ways in which the WTO may itself provide venues for the development of ecologically sensitive forms of (economic) governance.
Adaptive governance provides a framework within which such possibilities can be investigated and imagined. In particular, our picture of adaptive governance echoes 58 Atik, ' Science and International Regulatory Convergence ' , 17 Northwestern J Int'l L and Business (1997) 736; Walker, supra note 14; Victor, supra note 12; Winickoff et al. , supra note 12; Christoforou, supra note 12; Howse, supra note 12. 59 Wirth, supra note 12 , 857; Christoforou, supra note 12, 648; Walker, supra note 14, 304. 60 Winickoff, et al. , supra note 12, 111; Christoforou, supra note 12, 636. Dispute Settlement Understanding , Art. 11. See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 61; Christoforou, supra note 12, 635; Guzman, supra note 47, 17 ff; Winickoff et al. , supra note 12, 108. the calls of numerous commentators for the ' proceduralization ' of WTO review. 63 The core claim here is that WTO review should focus on the procedures by which regulatory decisions are made, and ' should be aimed at enforcing the transparent, accountable and reasoned use of science and risk assessment ' . 64 That is to say, particularly in circumstances characterized by a high degree of scientifi c uncertainty, the WTOlegality of SPS measures should be determined primarily by procedural criteria, rather than their substantive rationality. Some commentators, for example, have proposed process-based criteria for determining what constitutes ' arbitrary and unjustifi able discrimination ' (Article 2.3), and for determining when provisional measures under Article 5.7 are legitimate. 65 Similarly, Howse has examined the interpretation of many key provisions from the perspective of their potential for enhancing deliberative democracy at the national level. 66 For us, as well as for these authors, the point of proceduralization is not primarily to ensure that the WTO interferes less substantively with democratic decisions at the national level, but rather to use the international trade regime in a more positive way to facilitate, and provide an impetus for, the development of appropriate governance frameworks at the national level. 67 
Encouraging the Ongoing Evolution of National Regulatory Frameworks
We noted in the previous section that one of the core characteristics of adaptive governance is the incorporation of a feedback mechanism, which closely monitors the outcomes of policy and channels the lessons learnt back to policy-making venues in an iterative process of learning. This process can help to ensure that policies are constantly and fl exibly updated as new information is brought to light, and as the results of previous policy experiments come to be known.
Implementing adaptive governance in the WTO may require that the WTO permit and (to the extent consistent with its mandate) facilitate and promote the incorporation of such feedback mechanisms in national institutions of environmental governance. Clearly, it is in principle perfectly permissible under the SPS Agreement for Members' SPS regimes to be subject to continuous scientifi c review and revision. 68 But the one-off nature of WTO dispute settlement may undermine the WTO's ability to actively facilitate such continuous review. WTO review procedures are designed to assess the WTOcompliance of particular regulatory arrangements at a fi xed moment in time, and are thus not well designed for the task of reviewing rapidly evolving regulatory structures. 63 that such supervision could in practice itself turn into an undue constraint on domestic regulatory freedom, it is in principle possible that the expanded application of Article 5.7-type procedures to many (perhaps most) SPS measures could provide a benefi cial mix of relaxed substantive supervision, combined with forms of context-specifi c ongoing supervision aimed at encouraging continuous learning in particular domestic environments. Clearly, the desirability of such an expansion would be subject to the points made above concerning the need for precaution and the proceduralization of review.
B The WTO as Venue for Policy Learning
The implications of adaptive governance for the WTO are not limited to the role it can play in enabling and facilitating adaptive responses at national level. As a governance body which responds to a broad set of uncertain and unpredictable dynamics -environmental, social, and economic -the WTO itself could benefi t by adopting adaptive governance principles in its own operations. This means understanding the WTO less as a set of rules constraining state behaviour, and more as a venue for facilitating policy learning.
Feedback, Monitoring and Revision in the WTO Itself
One of the characteristics of adaptive governance identifi ed earlier was the integration of feedback mechanisms in policy-making processes. In addition to encouraging iterative review processes at the national level, such mechanisms for feedback and review may also be necessary within the WTO itself. To a limited extent, these already exist. For example, the SPS Committee is authorized periodically to review the operation and implementation of the SPS Agreement and, where appropriate, to submit proposals to amend the text of the Agreement having regard to the experience gained in its implementation. 74 Two major reviews have occurred so far -one completed in 1999 and the other in 2005 -though no formal amendments have been proposed to date. 75 In addition, the SPS Committee meets approximately three times per year to perform a variety of other review functions. It has, for example, developed guidelines and procedures for the implementation of numerous provisions of the SPS Agreement, which are themselves reviewed periodically and modifi ed frequently. 76 Furthermore, the Committee monitors the development and use of international standards, and receives information from Members having diffi culty implementing their obligations under the agreement and co-ordinates requests for technical assistance.
However, there are ways in which this review mechanism could be expanded and made more effective from the perspective of adaptive governance. Most importantly, the Committee's monitoring activities are focussed primarily on questions of compliance and implementation, rather than on refl exively evaluating the outcomes and content of the SPS Agreement itself. This criticism is applicable not just to the work of the SPS 74 SPS Agreement, Art. 12.7. Committee, but more broadly to the variety of monitoring mechanisms in place within the WTO. 77 There is, of course, a degree of overlap between these functions: collecting information on the challenges and constraints faced by Members in implementing their obligations can, for example, lead to a re-examination of the obligations themselves. But there is nevertheless a strong argument that the Committee should collect a broader range of information about the practical operation of the agreement. The Committee could, for example, request and collect information from Members on how the disciplines contained in the SPS Agreement are taken into account in the decision-making practices of national offi cials, and more particularly how the agreement has infl uenced the evolution of specifi c regulatory regimes, such as those to control the introduction of IAS.
78 The Committee could also collate information on the relationship between the intensifi cation of international trade fl ows and the incidence of particular problems known to be related to trade, such as the spread of harmful IAS. The mere collation of this information would be a useful function for many trade policy-makers, and would seem to be a necessary part of building a picture of how WTO policy interventions impact on the real world. Some of this information, it should be said, is already produced elsewhere: expanding the monitoring role of the SPS Committee may therefore be most easily implemented by increasing the (already signifi cant) number and variety of organizations with which it regularly shares information and which are granted observer status in its own proceedings.
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In addition to expanding the monitoring role of the trade regime, there is room to develop its revision and amendment function. Easy and effective revision of decisions is important not only to facilitate the incorporation of new knowledge into new policy, but also to increase the reversibility of WTO interventions. We noted above that no formal amendment to the SPS Agreement has been proposed or discussed within the SPS Committee. This may be partly because such amendment is not perceived as necessary, but no doubt it also has much to do with the signifi cant obstacles facing any proposal for formal amendment of the WTO Agreements. These obstacles have been 77 In relation to the TPRM, e.g., see the comments of Hoekman, supra note 28. See also the references infra in note 79.
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The precise empirical effect of WTO obligations on processes of regulatory decision-making in different policy areas across different countries remains under-researched. The same absence of refl exive self-monitoring has been noted by other commentators in the development context: see, e.g., Hoekman, supra note 28, 12, as well as -in a different context -WTO documents S/CSS/M/9 (in which Pakistan makes a very comprehensive case for a comprehensive assessment of the empirical impact of the GATS) and S/CSS/W/114. 84 or increasing the availability of more focussed legal tools such as waivers or variations. 85 All of these possibilities -with the possible exception of waivers -face formidable political obstacles, and are unlikely to be implemented soon.
However, little attention has been paid to the possibility of softer or more informal modes of revision, which are in fact already occurring to some extent within certain parts of the WTO system, including the SPS Committee itself. It is important to remember that the WTO legal system is more than just the WTO texts as interpreted by the Appellate Body and Panels -these rules are embedded within, and shaped by, a wide variety of informal understandings and social norms at play within the trading system. Particularly where legal texts are ambiguous, little known, or poorly understood (and this is very often the case in the WTO context), normative guidance is provided, not so much by rules themselves, but by semi-formal consensus concerning how they are to be implemented, and how they apply in particular circumstances. The point is that the SPS Committee is one venue in which such semi-formal norms are generated and revised: indeed, as Wolfe has observed, ' most ' clarifi cation ' of the SPS Agreement seems to come, not from Appellate Body decisions, but from how offi cials understand the WTO ' acquis ' through their ongoing negotiations with each other ' . 86 In addition to the guidance notes, referred to above, which the Committee has generated on the implementation of certain obligations, 87 it has also recently been asked to issue 80 This infl exibility results in part from cumbersome procedures for their amendment -in practice typically requiring a consensus of all WTO Members. It is also in part because of the ' hard ' character of WTO law. The presumption that all new negotiated rules will be enforceable through the dispute settlement mechanism creates signifi cant obstacles to the rapid adoption of new or amended rules: Abbott ' clarifi cations ' of certain SPS provisions, and is currently considering these requests.
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Such activities are carefully circumscribed, so as not to change formal rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement, and they are certainly not authoritative interpretations in the sense of Article IX:2. Nevertheless, they perform crucial functions of norm generation and revision, which some have described as quasi-legislative in nature.
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It is possible to envisage the Committee playing precisely these roles in relation to the problem of IAS: building a consensus that certain kinds of precautionary regulation are acceptable with appropriate safeguards, developing procedures for the effi cient and legitimate introduction of ' black-white-grey ' list approaches, and issuing nonbinding clarifi cations of relevant SPS provisions to elaborate on their application in the specifi c context of IAS regulation. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the concerns that such a semiformal process raises. To the extent that the SPS Committee is a body with very limited participation, and equally limited biodiversity expertise and experience, there are legitimate questions whether it is an appropriate body to be performing such normgenerating functions. Nevertheless, in our view such concerns suggest the need (fully consistent with an adaptive governance approach) to expand the level and nature of participation in Committee procedures, rather than the need to limit the Committee's function. Indeed, increasing overall levels of transparency and participation within the WTO itself is of central importance for adaptive governance approaches to work.
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This is particularly the case in respect of those actors with interests, experience, and expertise in biodiversity matters, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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There is, after all, no reason to assume that, simply because it is a body within the trade regime, the SPS Committee need necessarily develop a culture which is insuffi ciently aware of, or sympathetic to, environmental concerns.
Problem-centred Information Exchange
The incorporation of principles of adaptive governance into international economic governance may also enourage institutions such as the WTO to create new collaborative forums for co-operative problem-solving and information exchange. Such forums would be oriented towards the reciprocal provision and dissemination of information, through regularized interactions of key policy-makers and offi cials. 92 This would involve a shift in the role that the WTO sees itself as playing, to include a vision of international economic institutions as ' knowledge centres or intermediaries, and as dialogue partners in the process of learning ' . See Scott, supra note 79 , ch. 2. 90 We have not stressed this aspect as much as others, primarily because so much has already been written on it. However, this should not be understood as in any way minimizing the importance of increased participation and accountability in WTO decision-making processes in general. Hoekman, supra note 28, 11.
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Sabel and Reddy, supra note 28, at 9.
The WTO has been critiqued by some commentators for defining itself too narrowly as merely a forum for negotiation and adversarial dispute settlement. 94 However justified in other areas, this critique seems less true in the area of SPS measures. 95 Apart from its monitoring and review functions just described, the SPS Committee also encourages countries to submit specific concerns that they may have about the SPS measures imposed by their trading partners, for informal ad hoc consultations with the regulating Member.
96 There have been well over 200 such concerns raised, and it seems that they often provide an occasion for precisely the kinds of problem-centred information exchange that is valued by adaptive governance approaches. In her review of the activity of the Committee in this area, Scott notes that, in this context, ' [r] elations between Members are characterised by far-reaching co-operation, leading to mutual adjustment of regulatory expectation and regulatory performance, and to collaboration in problem-solving ' . 97 Wolfe, too, has drawn attention to the importance of this aspect of the Committee's workparticularly in comparison with the more formalized dispute settlement procedureand to the benefits that it provides.
98 Interestingly, furthermore, there have been proposals to develop further mechanisms along these lines in other areas of the WTO's work.
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Even outside the context of specifi c disputes, the SPS Committee could also act as a forum for exchanging knowledge and information. Peer review in the context of the SPS Committee can encourage policy experimentation, as strategies used in one part of the world are regularly and rapidly disseminated to others, and potentially adapted for local use. It can facilitate the identifi cation of potential issues, as policy-makers in one country learn about problems faced by others. It helps to generate important transgovernmental social and professional networks between food safety and other experts, as well as inter-departmental knowledge networks across the fi elds of both trade and environmental policy. 100 Furthermore, on a number of occasions international scrutiny of SPS measures has led to co-operative assistance, as importing countries transfer both knowledge and resources to exporting Members to assist in the creation of stronger and more effective regulatory frameworks to achieve their objectives. 101 It may be that interactions of this sort may serve as something of a model for other venues within the WTO system. See Wolfe, supra note 86. 96 We owe this observation and its elaboration to Joanne Scott, and her important work on the SPS Committee, cited supra note 79, as well as to Wolfe's insightful paper, supra note 86. 
Conclusion
This article began as a contribution to the growing literature on the implications of scientifi c uncertainty for the WTO, and in particular the interpretation and application of the SPS Agreement. Most commentators in this area have focussed on a limited number of issues: the need to ensure that WTO Members maintain the ability to take precautionary protective measures; the danger of WTO dispute settlement panels attempting to arbitrate competing scientifi c views; and the importance of WTO panels not attempting to ' second-guess ' domestic regulatory choices. While our approach encompasses and reiterates some of these claims, our aim here has been to show that the implications of pervasive scientifi c uncertainty for the WTO go much deeper than this, and include the model of governance on which the operation of the WTO is premised.
In ecological science, the growing recognition of the complexity and unpredictability of many ecological systems, and the consequent extent and persistence of uncertainty in our knowledge of their dynamics, has led to demands for new forms and methods of environmental management. These demands have prompted an extensive literature on ' adaptive management ' . We have drawn on this (and cognate) literature to offer a much broader and more comprehensive framework for how the WTO might respond most productively to the various uncertainties which face it. We argue for the re-articulation of the WTO's operations according to the principles of ' adaptive governance ' : continuous learning should become a central objective of the WTO; policy-making in the WTO should become self-consciously experimentalist in nature and explicitly seek to avoid irreversible harm; the outcomes of policy-making in the WTO should be subject to continuous and close monitoring; and the review function performed by the WTO should be defi ned and justifi ed primarily according to a procedural rather than substantive rationality.
We offered some preliminary and necessarily incomplete indications of what this model of governance might look like in the WTO, focusing in particular on the regulation of invasive alien species. We found that while some aspects of the WTO's operation already fi t within this framework, in other important respects current widespread concerns that the WTO may restrict effective policy responses to persistent uncertainty are well-founded. For example, we drew attention to specifi c concerns about the operation of SPS Articles 2 and 5, which we believe may in practice hinder the adoption of proactive responses to uncertainty by national authorities, at least in some circumstances. We noted a need for more systematic processes for collecting and disseminating knowledge about the impact of the international trading system on the incidence and impacts of IAS around the world, as well as a need for more structured processes by which this knowledge infl uences the continuing evolution of the norms and rules of the trading system. We observed that WTO dispute settlement processes are in some ways poorly suited to the review of highly adaptive national regulatory structures, and argued for the development of forms of softer but more continuous review more suited to this task. Finally, we argued for increased focus on spaces for problem-centred information exchange in the WTO, and identifi ed the SPS Committee as a potentially important venue for such activity in relation to the regulation of IAS.
